HomeCentral BanksReserve Bank of Australia(RBA) Minutes of the Monetary Policy Board Meeting

(RBA) Minutes of the Monetary Policy Board Meeting

Sydney – 2 and 3 November 2026

Members participating

Michele Bullock (Governor and Chair), Andrew Hauser (Deputy Governor and Deputy Chair), Marnie Baker AM, Melinda Cilento, Renée Fry-McKibbin, Carolyn Hewson AO, Bruce Preston, Iain Ross AO, Jenny Wilkinson PSM

Others participating

Sarah Hunter (Assistant Governor, Economic), Christopher Kent (Assistant Governor, Financial Markets)

Anthony Dickman (Secretary), David Norman (Deputy Secretary)

Meredith Beechey Osterholm (Head, Monetary Policy Strategy Department), Sally Cray (Chief Communications Officer), David Jacobs (Head, Domestic Markets Department), Michael Plumb (Head, Economic Analysis Department), Penelope Smith (Head, International Department)

Financial conditions

Members began their discussion of financial conditions by noting that market pricing still implied an expectation that central banks in most countries would raise their policy rate a few times over the year ahead, particularly in economies where monetary policy was currently judged to be accommodative. Even so, expectations for policy rates had eased somewhat since the previous meeting, including in response to a reassessment of the future profitability of some artificial intelligence (AI)-related sectors. Australian policy rate expectations had largely followed these global trends.

Government bond yields had eased in tandem with policy rate expectations over October. Nonetheless, long-term government bond yields remained higher than in early August across most advanced economies, including Australia. Members noted that the increases since August had not been driven by a rise in long-term inflation expectations – financial market measures of longer-term inflation compensation remained broadly consistent with central bank targets, though shorter-term measures were higher owing to the elevated near-term outlook for inflation in many countries. Given this, the increase in long-term yields in preceding months appeared to reflect some combination of higher expected policy rates and higher term premia.

Estimates of the neutral rate in Australia and elsewhere appeared to have trended higher over prior years, implying that any given path for official interest rates was likely to be less restrictive than previously. This most likely reflected a range of factors, including the reduction in global saving (as fiscal deficits in several major advanced economies remained large) and the increase in global investment, in particular relating to AI. Despite this, the current Australian cash rate and its market-implied future path both remained above the top of the range of various central estimates of the neutral rate. Judged on this basis alone, monetary policy appeared to be restrictive, but members noted that estimates of neutral rates are inherently uncertain and do not provide a direct guide for monetary policy. Members also discussed the implications of what appeared to have been a rise in term premia on long-term Australian bonds. They noted that the restrictive effects on the economy of higher term premia appeared smaller in Australia than elsewhere, given Australian borrowing costs are on average more closely tied to the short end of the yield curve than in some other countries.

On a nominal, trade-weighted basis, the Australian dollar had been little changed over preceding months and was around 5 per cent higher since the start of the year. Its level remained consistent with estimates of its longer-run equilibrium level, suggesting that the exchange rate channel of monetary policy was operating broadly as expected. As usual, there was a degree of uncertainty around this assessment.

Trends in household borrowing also suggested that financial conditions were restrictive. Housing prices and lending for new housing had declined quite sharply and household credit growth had continued to slow. The decline in lending for new housing had been pronounced for investors, in part reflecting recent tax changes. Scheduled household loan payments had risen to around their 2024 peak (as a percentage of household disposable income), following the increases in the cash rate earlier in the year. Moreover, members noted that the household credit-to-income ratio was significantly lower than its average following the global financial crisis, after accounting for the sizeable balances in offset accounts. Members observed that these substantial buffers could mean that the cash flow channel of monetary policy was not having as strong an effect on spending behaviour as might otherwise have been the case. Indeed, extra mortgage payments into offset and redraw accounts had declined over preceding quarters to be a bit below average, perhaps supporting consumption by mortgage holders. More generally, members noted some signs of household resilience, including the relatively stable share of indebted households drawing down steadily on their offset and redraw accounts and the low level of housing loan arrears.

By contrast, corporate funding conditions remained favourable, both globally and in Australia, suggesting that financial conditions were not particularly restrictive. Growth in the debt of Australian businesses remained very strong and broadly based, though data centre developers had raised debt equivalent to at least one-fifth of the increase in business debt this year. Funding for firms generally remained readily available. Equity prices in major markets were still high relative to earnings expectations, despite some decline since August. Spreads on the bonds of sub-investment-grade corporate issuers in the United States and euro area had increased but remained low by historical standards. Investors had become more discriminating in their pricing of firms exposed to AI-related investments amid concerns about prospective returns and the cost of servicing growing levels of debt. This had seen investors mark down the price of equity and debt for some firms that were more reliant on debt financing. Some Australian data centre operators had seen their equity prices fall and credit spreads widen. Funding conditions had also tightened for private credit lenders, which could reduce the availability of credit for residential property developers.

Members concluded that these trends implied that domestic financial conditions were likely to be restrictive but that contrasting trends in various indicators made the extent of restraint difficult to gauge.

Market expectations for the cash rate target had risen over the preceding three months and were higher in the near term than at the time of the previous meeting. The increase had occurred against the backdrop of stronger-than-expected domestic inflation, higher oil prices and RBA communications about the economic outlook. Overnight indexed swap pricing implied an 85 per cent probability of an increase in the cash rate at this meeting and an expectation that the cash rate would be around 35 basis points higher than its current level by mid-2027. Almost all market economists tracked by the staff expected an increase at this meeting.

Economic conditions

Members began their discussion of economic conditions by considering developments in inflation.

Inflation in the September quarter had been stronger than expected in August, and well above the target, both in headline and underlying terms. Inflation had been broadly based, although retail fuel prices had made the largest contribution to the upside surprise in headline inflation. The staff judged that the stronger-than-expected outcome for underlying inflation reflected greater domestic capacity pressures than had been assessed previously. Notably, inflation for market services (excluding telecommunication and domestic travel) had increased in the September quarter and was noticeably stronger than expected in August. Members noted that this category was typically among the most sensitive to domestic economic conditions.

The staff’s updated central projections were for a significantly higher rate of inflation than had been forecast in August, especially for the year ahead, despite a higher assumed path for the cash rate. Both headline and underlying inflation were now expected to remain above 3 per cent until late 2027, given the high outcomes in the September quarter and prior quarters, before returning to the midpoint of the target range in mid-2028; in each case these dates were later than had been expected in August. The upward revisions reflected the incorporation into the central inflation forecast of several factors that had been identified as upside risks in the August Statement on Monetary Policy. Even after this, the staff judged the risks to the inflation forecast to be to the upside. In the immediate future, they noted that headline inflation would be likely to be significantly higher in October than in September, as subsidies received by households a year earlier drop out of the year-ended calculation.

Members turned to consider the drivers of the forecast profile for underlying inflation. The two main factors were domestic capacity pressures, which accounted for a large share of the forecast high underlying inflation over the coming year or so, and the expectation that pass-through of cost pressures associated with the Middle East conflict to underlying inflation would build over coming quarters and be a noticeable contributor to high underlying inflation by early 2027. Members explored each of these factors in turn.

Regarding the Middle East conflict, members noted that prices of crude oil and refined petroleum products had risen by 20–25 per cent since August amid the ongoing conflict. The oil price futures curve had also shifted up substantially over that period and this had been reflected in the forecast assumption, alongside increases in other commodity and refined petroleum product prices. Nonetheless, the forecasts’ technical assumptions, which followed futures prices, still had oil prices retracing a sizeable share of the recent rise over the coming two years. Members noted that, for this assumption to be valid, there would need to be some degree of resolution of the conflict. They also discussed the staff’s assessment of the extent to which conflict-induced increases in costs would be passed into underlying inflation. Members noted that the staff had assumed around two-thirds of this additional cost would be passed on. They explored the potential for pass-through to be either higher or lower, depending on the duration of the cost pressure and the outlook for aggregate demand.

Underlying strength in the global economy was also expected to add to Australian cost pressures. GDP growth in Australia’s major trading partners had increased over the preceding year or more and had consistently exceeded expectations. Most recently, this reflected strength in global AI-related demand and supportive fiscal measures in some major economies, which more than offset the negative impact of the Middle East conflict. Members noted that the global surge in data centre investment was creating capacity constraints in related supply chains and contributing to significant increases in the prices of some technology goods, including some consumer goods. This had the potential to increase Australian import prices and add to inflation. More broadly, members noted that core inflation was above central bank targets in many advanced economies. Core inflation globally was expected to ease only gradually, as the boost from AI-related investment slows and tighter global financial conditions and continued slowing in China weigh on growth in Australia’s major trading partners.

The other main driver of the inflation outlook was the assessment of capacity constraints. Members noted that the staff’s latest assessment of the rate of unemployment that was consistent with low and stable inflation (the ‘NAIRU’) was higher than previously thought. As a result, capacity pressures were judged to have been somewhat greater in 2026 than previously assessed, a risk that had been raised in the August Statement. The staff’s reassessment of capacity constraints was based on persistently higher-than-expected inflation, ongoing strong growth in labour and non-labour input costs, broad-based reports from liaison contacts of sustained cost pressures, competition for labour in some states and industries, and survey measures suggesting above-average levels of capacity utilisation. These trends meant that a range of staff models had for some time been pointing to a higher NAIRU than had been incorporated in the forecasts.

Members noted the substantial uncertainties around this judgement and explored potential challenges to it. Most notably, they observed that growth in the Wage Price Index (WPI) had remained broadly stable and in line with forecasts to date; within that, wages growth for workers on individual arrangements (which tends to be most responsive to labour market conditions) had slowed. Members discussed the extent to which ongoing weak productivity growth might reconcile trends in the WPI with a higher NAIRU, noting that growth in unit labour costs remained above the level judged consistent with the inflation target. They also explored whether factors other than a higher NAIRU might account for the higher-than-expected inflation outcomes.

Finally, members considered the risk to the inflation outlook associated with increases in some measures of short- and longer-term inflation expectations for households and businesses. Members noted that if these measures accurately capture a more persistent emerging increase in inflation expectations, this could influence wage- and price-setting decisions and make it harder to return inflation to target. Members noted that expectations are difficult to measure reliably, and that the Business Outlook Scenarios Survey (BOSS) in particular has only a short history. At the same time, members noted that the results of the BOSS survey were consistent with information from liaison.

Members then turned to discuss indicators of domestic economic activity, which had been mixed. GDP growth had slowed to a little below its potential growth rate in 2026, but more recent data had suggested somewhat more growth in activity than anticipated in the August forecasts. This had been supported by very strong investment in data centres, though members highlighted the resilience of business investment more generally. The near-term momentum in consumption was uncertain, given starkly contrasting trends in different indicators, but the staff expected growth in the September quarter to have been similar to the June quarter’s below-trend rate. Turnover in the housing market had weakened significantly over preceding months. The Middle East conflict was assessed to have had only modest effects on overall domestic activity.

The forecast for GDP growth had been revised a little higher in the near term, driven by a much stronger outlook for investment in data centres. Notwithstanding this, GDP growth was expected to remain below estimates of its potential growth rate over the forecast period. Forecast growth had also been revised lower from mid-2027 onwards, because of the higher assumed cash rate path and a weaker outlook for the housing market. Overall, the forecast level of GDP at the end of 2028 was broadly unchanged from the August forecasts.

Members discussed the risks surrounding the forecast for output growth, which the staff assessed as broadly balanced. The main upside risk came from the possibility of stronger-than-expected global growth and AI-related demand. On the downside, members noted that the Middle East conflict or the downturn in the housing market could have larger effects on demand than assumed. They discussed how the cyclical downturn in the housing market would be likely to affect the economy through lower housing turnover, which could weigh on activity both directly and indirectly (via weaker demand for housing-related goods and services). Members noted that the central projection for GDP growth had been lowered to account for this but there were plausible scenarios in which the effects were larger.

The unemployment rate had increased by more than expected over preceding months. The staff’s judgement was that this largely reflected stronger-than-expected labour supply: employment growth had held up as expected, and liaison and leading indicators suggested a stable near-term outlook for labour demand. In the central projection, labour market conditions were forecast to ease, consistent with below-potential GDP growth. The unemployment rate was now forecast to rise to 5.1 per cent by the end of 2028. This was around ¼ percentage point higher than previously expected, largely reflecting a higher starting point and an expectation that more people would remain in or join the labour force (including to alleviate the higher cost of living). The outlook for employment growth was similar to that in the August Statement.

Given the revised judgement for the NAIRU and the projections for activity and labour market conditions, the staff’s assessment was that aggregate demand and potential supply in the economy would most likely return to balance around mid-2027, slightly later than previously thought. Spare capacity was then expected to emerge in the following year. Members reiterated the significant inherent uncertainty around any assessment of spare capacity.

Considerations for monetary policy

Turning to considerations for the monetary policy decision, members noted that inflation was still too high and forecast to remain so for another year. The forecast had inflation returning to the midpoint of the target range in mid-2028, somewhat later than previously projected. Members noted that the staff had centralised some of the upside risks to inflation identified in August but still viewed the risks to the latest inflation forecast as being skewed to the upside.

The economy was assessed to be operating with excess demand and members noted that the forecast was for this to persist until mid-2027. The unemployment rate had risen by more than had been expected and the forecast for the unemployment rate over the coming two years had been revised up. However, the implications of this for inflation were broadly offset in the forecasts by a higher assessment of the unemployment rate consistent with full employment. That reassessment had led the staff to judge that the labour market had been tighter in early 2026 than previously assessed. GDP growth was forecast to be stronger in the near term than had been expected in August, driven by a stronger outlook for investment in data centres. But GDP growth was still projected to be below its potential over coming years as the effects of restrictive monetary policy accumulated. The staff judged that there were risks to both sides of this forecast.

Members noted that financial conditions were judged to be restrictive, but mixed signals made it difficult to assess the extent of the restrictiveness. Global developments had contributed to a likely further rise in the real neutral rate in Australia.

In light of these observations, members considered whether to raise the cash rate target by 25 basis points at this meeting or to leave it unchanged.

The case to raise the cash rate target by 25 basis points at this meeting was founded on concerns about the further deterioration in the outlook for inflation, continued upside risks to the inflation forecast and an assessment that financial conditions may not be as restrictive as that backdrop required.

One argument for raising the cash rate target at this meeting was if members assessed that recent information on inflation – both the September quarter data and the staff’s latest central projection – signalled a more inflationary environment than previously assessed. This argument for raising the cash rate would be strengthened if members judged the inflationary pressure to be driven in part by stronger-than-expected domestic capacity pressures. Members cited three pieces of evidence that could support such an argument. One was the high rate of inflation in prices for market services in the September quarter, coupled with the other data and survey indicators pointing to elevated capacity pressures over a longer period. Another was persistently strong growth in unit labour costs. The third was the consistent message from liaison of broad-based cost pressures. Taken together, this information could imply that domestic capacity pressures had been playing a more significant role in driving inflation than previously assessed. If so, higher capacity pressures were likely to enable firms to pass on a larger share of the cost pressures emanating from higher oil prices and other global developments. In considering this argument, members observed that the significantly higher forecast path for inflation would also add to the price level and further erode the welfare of Australians, especially those on lower incomes who do not receive inflation-linked government welfare support.

A second argument for raising the cash rate target at this meeting was if members judged that risks to the inflation forecast remained to the upside, consistent with the staff’s assessment. Members noted three main risks that could support such a judgement. One was that the forecasts were conditioned on a technical assumption that oil prices would decline by around US$30 per barrel over the coming two years, implying significant upside risk if higher prices persisted. Another was that inflation had proven to be persistent across a range of countries, even after abstracting from higher oil prices, which was likely to support higher import prices for Australia. A third was that some members saw a growing possibility that medium-term inflation expectations might be significantly higher over the year ahead, given projections of a further elongation of the period over which inflation exceeded 3 per cent and the very high rate of annual headline inflation expected for October 2026. Members observed that persistently higher inflation expectations would both make it more likely that firms could pass through a greater share of cost pressures and increase the challenge of returning inflation to target on a sustainable basis.

Finally, members noted that the case to raise the cash rate target at this meeting would be strengthened further if they judged that financial conditions were not sufficiently restrictive. They noted that one reason to form this judgement was if they assessed that some portion of the 100 basis points of tightening earlier in the year had served to remove a degree of accommodation that had prevailed in late 2025. Another reason would be if members judged that the neutral interest rate in Australia had increased over the prior year. Members also noted that the forecasts saw underlying inflation return to 2½ per cent only under the assumption of the additional tightening embodied in the market curve. Together, these considerations could imply that an increase in the cash rate at this meeting was warranted to provide greater assurance that financial conditions were sufficiently restrictive to bring the economy back to balance within a reasonable timeframe.

The case to leave the cash rate target unchanged at this meeting was founded on a view that, while further tightening in monetary policy might still be required, there was no need to make that judgement immediately and the prevailing downside risks made it prudent to wait for more evidence before deciding.

One argument in support of this case was that the 100 basis points of tightening already delivered this year, including the decision at the previous meeting, was still working its way through the economy. Members noted that the full effects of that tightening on the economy were not yet apparent in the data and that it was uncertain how large an impact it would have, given the long and variable lags. This argument could be further strengthened if the tightening in monetary policy at the previous meeting was judged to have been a sufficient response to concerns that upside risks to inflation from higher oil prices, strength in AI-related demand and capacity pressures were materialising.

A second argument for leaving the cash rate target unchanged at this meeting was if members placed significant weight on potential downside risks to the outlook for growth. The ½ percentage point rise in the unemployment rate over the preceding six months had been larger than expected and could be signalling that demand conditions were already slowing enough to bring the economy back to balance without further tightening of monetary policy. Another prominent risk related to the cyclical downturn in the housing market. Members noted that it was possible that the decline in housing turnover would reduce economic activity by more than the average historical response incorporated in the central forecasts, as envisaged in the staff’s downside scenario. That, in turn, would worsen the outlook for the labour market and dampen wage and price inflation. Downside risks might be further amplified if sentiment towards data centre construction proved more fragile than anticipated, as suggested by financial market movements in the lead-up to the meeting.

Finally, the case to leave the cash rate target unchanged would be further strengthened if the risks to inflation were judged to be more balanced than the staff assessed. Some members observed that the monthly pace of inflation in market services inflation had slowed through the September quarter. They acknowledged that this could reflect a residual seasonal pattern, since the monthly market services data were not seasonally adjusted (given the short time series), but, alternatively, could signal somewhat less inflationary pressure than the forecast embodies. A more balanced assessment of the risks to inflation could also be supported if members viewed the stability in wages growth over the preceding year as being inconsistent with the staff’s judgement that the labour market was still a little tight. This, in turn, would suggest that the staff’s forecast for wages growth over the period to mid-2027 may be too high, given the expected softening in the labour market. Finally, the evidence for there being a heightened risk to medium- to long-term inflation expectations rested on information that was either new or imprecise; the more established financial market measures of inflation expectations showed inflation expectations still to be well anchored.

Having considered these various arguments, most members determined that the case to increase the cash rate target at this meeting was the stronger one. These members judged that forward-looking inflationary pressures had risen and that the risks to the inflation outlook were still on the upside. They also assessed that the current level of the cash rate was not clearly sufficient to address these risks and return the economy to balance, given a potential increase in the neutral interest rate and the extent to which inflation had increased over the preceding year or so. These members judged that a higher cash rate would therefore best balance the risks surrounding the Board’s two objectives. In particular, they judged the risks of unintentionally leaving monetary policy insufficiently restrictive (potentially allowing medium- to long-term inflation expectations to rise) currently to outweigh the probability associated with unintentionally setting monetary policy too tight (potentially leading to a faster or greater easing in labour market capacity pressures). In concluding their assessment, these members cited the length of time inflation had been – and was projected to remain – above target and the likelihood of even higher near-term headline inflation outcomes. They also cited various tentative signs of residual economic resilience: employment was forecast to continue growing, the impact on spending of the higher level of the cash rate target and the cyclical downturn in the housing market appeared so far to have been broadly in line with staff forecasts, and aggregate household savings buffers implied this could continue. These conclusions led the majority of members to determine that monetary policy needed to be tighter.

A minority of members determined instead that the case to leave the cash rate target unchanged at this meeting was the stronger one. These members judged that, having tightened policy in September to mitigate the upside risks to inflation, it was prudent to leave more time to assess how the 100 basis points of tightening already delivered would affect the economy. They also placed somewhat less weight than the other members on the upside risks to inflation and somewhat more weight on the downside risks to economic growth. These members expressed their concern that the economy might be near the point of entering a materially sharper downturn and pointed to the costs in terms of unemployment.

In finalising its statement, all members resolved to be attentive to the data and the evolving assessment of the outlook and risks when making their decisions. The Board agreed to continue to do what it considers necessary to bring inflation sustainably back to target. Members noted that monetary policy is well placed to respond to developments and emphasised the Board’s focus on delivering price stability and full employment.

The decision

The Board decided to raise the cash rate target to 4.85 per cent. Six members voted in favour; three members voted to leave the cash rate target unchanged at 4.60 per cent.

 

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